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Introduction
The Paris climate accord in 2015 -the so-called COP21 -was a landmark effort on the part of countries to set and monitor commitments to mitigate global warming. The COP23 in 2017 in Bonn "sought to maintain the global momentum to decouple output from greenhouse gas emissions" (Gough, 2017) . However, the extent to which decoupling is taking place remains a matter of dispute. Drops in emissions often provoke claims from climate sceptics that worries over global warming are exaggerated, while increases in emissions lead to concerns among environmental groups that not enough is being done to address the issue. For instance, a rise in German emissions in 2016 led to alarm in some circles that the country had "further dented" its chances of reaching its 2020 climate targets (Wettengel, 2016) .
A first crack at the data on emissions and real GDP yields little evidence of decoupling. For six countries, including Italy, the elasticities are either essentially zero or negative, suggesting that the trend component of emissions has decoupled from the trend component in output.
We then apply the framework to consider the effects of international trade on the emissions-output elasticities. International trade "gives a mechanism for consumers to shift environmental pollution to distant lands" (Peters and Hertwich, 2008) . In particular, as Jaunky (2011) notes, it is possible that although developed economies "may have experienced a change in their production structure, their consumption structure remains unchanged"; hence, the decoupling may arise simply be because "dirty industries in developed countries tend to migrate" to developing economies. To account for these effects, we make a distinction between productionbased and consumption-based emissions, where the latter add in the emissions embodies in the net exports of countries. This does make some difference to our results and in the expected direction.
The evidence for decoupling for the richer nations gets weaker, including for many European To document progress on decoupling over time, the main sample is supplemented with longer time series for CO2 emissions. For 16 of our 20 countries we have data from 1946 onwards.
We find that the trend elasticities have declined over the second sub-period (post-1983) compared to the first (1946 to 1982). The average elasticity has declined to 0.7 from 1.1. For 13 countries, we have even longer time-series, sometime extending as far back as 1850. In each case, we find that the trend elasticity computed over the post-1990 period is much smaller than the elasticity over the full sample period; in the case of Germany for instance, the two estimates are -0.6 and 0.9, respectively.
We also provide evidence on some of the factors that may explain the cross-country variation in trend elasticities, such as per capita GDP, environmental and energy policies, and sectoral structure. We find some evidence that trend elasticities are lower for richer countries, measured either by their per capita GDP or sectoral structure (high share of services in value added relative to that of industry or agriculture). There is also evidence that policy actions to encourage use of renewables foster decoupling of emissions and output.
In addition to these findings about trend elasticities, we find that there is a strong cyclical relationship between emissions and output. The cyclical elasticity is positive for all countries and averages 0.5. For Germany, for instance, the cyclical elasticity is nearly 0.2, which can account for some the increase in emissions observed in 2016 as the economy boomed. In general, cyclical developments can often obscure the trend relationship. Moreover, unlike the trend elasticities, the cyclical elasticities have not declined much between the recent decades and the earlier ones.
The contribution of this paper is therefore threefold. First, it provides an account of how the link between emissions and output has evolved across the largest world GHG emitters, distinguishing trends from cyclical fluctuations. Using long-period as well data for the more recent period, we show that trend elasticities have declined over time (i.e. there is a movement towards decoupling). Second, we show that accounting for international trade linkages does not greatly affect estimates of trend elasticities in most cases. Third, we relate differences across countries in trend elasticities to country characteristics and policies. While there is a large literature on the emissions-output nexus, few studies have addressed all these issues for a large group of top emitters in one simple but comprehensive framework, which is the gap this paper seeks to fill.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the previous literature on decoupling of emissions and output. Section 3 describes our data and empirical approach. Section 4 presents our estimates of trend and cyclical elasticities and explores the determinants of cross-country differences in trend elasticities.
Literature Review
We situate our paper within the vast literature on decoupling by discussing four themes: (i) long-run emissions-output elasticities; (ii) changes in elasticities over time; (iii) consumptionbased emissions; and (iv) cyclical relationships.
Long-run emissions-output elasticities:
The thrust of our analysis is to measure decoupling using the long-run movements in emissions and output. While we use the standard trend/cycle decomposition used in many other fields of economics, other authors have implemented related ideas using other techniques. Narayan and Narayan (2010) use a panel cointegration model to estimate short-run and long-run elasticities-similar in spirit to our cyclical and trend elasticitiesof emissions with respect to output; in addition to the difference in technique from our paper, their Cyclical relationships: Some papers delve into the cyclical relationships between emissions and output as we do in our paper. Doda (2014) analyzes the heterogeneity in cyclical properties of CO2 emissions for a panel of countries and provides evidence of the higher volatility of cyclical emissions relative to GDP. 
Data and Framework

Data
Time period and country coverage: Our main sample covers data from 1990 through 2014. 2 The countries included are twenty largest GHG emitters, which account for 74 percent to the world total level of emissions, 63 percent of the world population, and 77 percent of global GDP. China, the U.S., India, Russia, and Japan are the largest GHG emitters. The major source of emissions is the energy sector, followed by agriculture. The twenty largest consumption-based GHG emitters is quite similar to the production-based group. 3 Advanced economies have much lower productionbased than consumption-based emissions, while the opposite is true for some emerging markets.
Emissions data: We use a broad measure of emissions that includes, in addition to CO2, methane The longer time series data are from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. For consumption-based emissions data we use the Eora multi-region input-output (MRIO) database, which provides data on both production and consumption emissions. Summary statistics on our data are provided in Table 1 . 
Econometric framework
The elasticity estimates shown earlier in Figure 1 (a) were based on the following specification:
where t e  and t y  are the growth rates of emissions and real GDP, respectively. As noted, the ω estimates are all positive. To be crystal clear, we reiterate that equation (1) is not our preferred specification for measuring decoupling; we simply use it in the introduction to the paper to show that a preliminary approach that does not distinguish trend movements from cyclical relationships would yield misleading conclusions about the extent of decoupling.
Our preferred approach is to distinguish between trends and cycles in both emissions and output. For this, we estimate equations (2) and (3) . For the cyclical relationship we estimate:  is the cyclical elasticity. 6 Similarly, we estimate the trend elasticity through the following specification:
where t e  is the trend of the log of emissions, t y  is the trend of log of real output and   is the trend elasticity. An intercept is included (  ) as countries may start out from relatively different initial conditions and have different historical level of emissions. 7 The estimation of equation (3) represents the thrust of our analysis as it measures the long-run co-movement of emissions and output; the estimates of   are therefore the focus of the paper.
To extract the cyclical and trend components we employ the commonly used HodrickPrescott (HP, 1981, 1997) filter. This filter minimizes the following function: 6 There is an analogy here with Okun's Law (Ball, Leigh and Loungani, 2017), which relates cyclical movements in labor market indicators, such as employment and unemployment, to cyclical movements in output. 7 We tested for cointegration between emissions and GDP using three different tests: Augmented Dickey Fuller, the Philipps-Perron and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin. In the vast majority of cases, the residuals were found to be stationary for the 1990-2014 period; for the longer time series, the early years were characterized by larger residuals. For reasons of parsimony the test results are not reported here. x , the cyclical component. Figure 2 shows the decomposition of emissions and output into cyclical and trend components for four advanced and four emerging market economies. Figure 4 shows the estimates of c  using production-based emissions for the 20 countries.
Results
Cyclical and trend elasticities
In all cases, the estimate is positive: emissions are procyclical. The average elasticity is 0.5 and the estimate is significantly different from zero in all but four cases (Australia, Saudi Arabia, Germany and Brazil). The differences between advanced and emerging markets are not large: the average elasticity is 0.6 for the former and 0.4 for the latter. 8 8 We also estimated cyclical elasticities using consumption-based emissions data. These estimates are higher than the production-based cyclical elasticities for most countries. We plan to investigate the possible reasons for this difference in future work. To address concerns about the endogeneity of output in the regressions estimated above, we also tried an instrumental variable (IV) approach, where a country's real output is instrumented by the trade-weighted real output of its trading partners (see Burke, Shahiduzzaman and Stern, 2015 , for the use of a similar instrument). 9 There are only two cases for which the IV estimates of the trend elasticity differ from that of the OLS estimate, Italy and Ukraine. Overall, the correlation between the IV and OLS estimates is 0.9. 10 We next look at the role that international trade may have played in helping advanced economies transition to a low-carbon path. Most advanced economies export goods and services that are less pollution-intensive than their imports. Consumption-based trend elasticities can reveal whether countries have maintained consumption patterns that are carbon-intensive despite reducing their (production-based) emissions. 9 As in other studies which use such an instrument, the real output growth of main trading partners variable is constructed from bilateral trade data from UN COMTRADE database and it is defined as the average growth rate of country i's top 20 trading partners weighted by country j's export share in country i. Moreover, the first stage regression confirmed the suitability and validity of the instrument used: the F-statistic (or robust Kleinberger-Papp rk Wald statistic) for weak identification exceeds all thresholds proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) . 10 We also estimated a bivariate VAR model to allow for a more dynamic relationship between emissions and output. In general, we found greater evidence for causality from output to emissions than in the other direction. 
Figure 6.b: Difference between Production-Based and Consumption-Based Trend Elasticities
Note: Each bar corresponds to the difference between the corresponding blue and orange bars in figure 6 .a. The lighter colors are used to indicate that the production-based elasticity is not statistically significant in figure 6 .a.
To this end, Figure 6a presents estimates the consumption-based trend elasticities for the 20 countries, while Figure 6b shows the difference between the production-based and the consumption-based elasticities to make it easier to see where the two differ substantially. The average consumption-based trend elasticity is 0.6, higher than the 0.4 average with production- based emissions. The average elasticity for advanced economies increases to 0.5 from zero, while the average elasticity for emerging markets remains essentially unchanged at about 0.7. The biggest differences occur largely in cases where the production-based trend elasticities were very low. For Germany, for instance, the consumption-based elasticity is -0.4, compared with -0.8 with production-based emissions. For France and Italy, the consumption-based elasticity is positive, while the production-based elasticity is negative. For the emerging markets, the differences are smaller, with Ukraine being an exception.
Determinants of Cross-Country Differences
Our results support Levinson's view that "pollution does not necessarily increase" as countries get richer. The evidence is summarized in Figure 7 by showing the average trend elasticities for production-based and consumption-based emissions for the advanced country group and emerging markets group. It is evident that, if anything, trend elasticities decline with per capita incomes, though the decline is starker with production-based estimates. Exploring further and plotting the elasticities against per capita income, there is some support for an inverted-U shape, as shown in Figure 8 . The impact occurs in part through the sectoral transformation of production as countries get richer and move into less pollution-intensive services sectors. This is illustrated in Figure 9 , which plots trend elasticities against the share of agriculture relative to services in value added (top panel) and the share of industry relative to services in value added (bottom panel). Countries with larger shares of agriculture or industry relative to services have higher trend elasticities, with the relationship holding more strongly for production-based than for consumption-based emissions. Trend elasticities are also correlated with measures of environmental policy setting capturing the relative attractiveness and quality of climate change policies. For both measures used, greater policy efforts to foster renewables and encourage energy efficiency, reflected in higher values of the indices, is correlated with lower trend elasticities. This is shown in Figure 10 for CCPI index (top panel) and the RECAI index (bottom panel). 11 Simple regressions of trend-based 11 The relationships are a bit weaker for consumption-based elasticities, perhaps reflecting the fact that the indices rank countries according to their policies on curbing production-based emissions rather than including measures embedding the carbon-intensity of consumption. Trend Elasticity (Consumption) production or consumption-based elasticities on measures of environmental policy setting (together with real GDP per capita and sectoral value-added ratios), confirm the negative and statistically significant influence of the former set of policies on long-run emissions. Given the small number of observations, these regressions should be regarded as suggestive, and further work is needed to understand fully these relationships. 
Changes in trend elasticities over time
We carry out two exercises to see how the production-based trend elasticities for CO2
emissions have changed over time. First, for the 20 countries in our sample, we compare elasticities for the post-WWII period with the period since the Great Moderation (post-1983). Table 2 The second exercise compares elasticities over long periods with those over the post-1990
period for 16 countries where we have historical data on both emissions and output. The estimates in Table 3 show that in all cases but one (Brazil), the elasticity for the later period is much lower than the one for the full sample. The reduction is more striking for the advanced economies (the average is 0.3 in the recent period compared with 1 over the full sample), but emerging markets have made progress as well-the averages are 0.9 and 1.3, respectively. 
Conclusions
We have proposed a simple but comprehensive framework-the trend/cycle decomposition that is widely used in many other fields in economics-to investigate the decoupling of emissions and growth. For the twenty largest emitters, the average trend elasticity, viz. the response of trend emissions to a 1 percent change in trend GDP, is 0.4. For the advanced economies within this group, the elasticity averages zero; some countries have negative elasticities, suggesting that they had made progress in decoupling their trend emissions from trend GDP.
Taking account of consumption-based emissions weakens the case for progress but does not overturn it. Encouragingly, we find suggestive evidence that trend elasticities can be lowered through policy efforts on the part of countries. Moreover, our investigation of the historical relationships between emissions and GDP shows that elasticities in recent decades are considerably lower than in previous decades.
